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Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and
Triggering Mechanisms 1
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY*

1. This report has been adapted from the following works by the author:
Christopher Blakesley, Atrocity and its Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia & Rwanda, Ch. 8, in WAR CRIMES: A SYNTHESIS OF NATIONAL
APPROACHES (1996); Christopher Blakesley, Comparing the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Crimes
Against HumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia & the Projt for an International
Criminal Court Preparedby the InternationalLaw Commission, 67 REVUE INT'L DE DROIT
PENAL 1, 33-46 (1996). Christopher Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent
War Crimes Tribunal, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77 (1994) [hereinafter Blakesley,
Obstacles]; CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY, chs. 1, 2 & Conclusion (1992) [hereinafter BLAKEsLEY,
TERRORISM]; COVEY T.

OLIVER ET AL.,

THE

INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL SYSTEM:

CASES &

MATERIALS, chs. 3, 10, 11, 16, 17 (1995). See also M. CHERIF BAssIoUNm, The Law OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); VERGInA MORRIS
& MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA vols. 1&2 (1995); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, Occasional Paper No. 2
(DePaul U. Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Inst., 1996); James Crawford, The ILC's Draft Statute for
an InternationalCriminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 140 (1994); Theodor Meron, The
Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 Fo. AFF. 122 (1993); Herman Woltring,
GeneralRapporteur, Report at the InternationalMeeting of Experts on the Establishment
of an InternationalCriminal Tribunal, in Vancouver, Canada, (Mar. 22-26, 1993); Kayal
et al., The Forty-Fourth Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the Special Session of the Commission
on Human Rights on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 410 (1993);
Payam Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture
for the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 262 (1993); Gualtieri, Draft, Comparison of
Proposals for an International Criminal Tribunal (DePaul U. Intl Hum. Rts. L. Inst.,
June 22, 1993). See also generally, ROGER S. CLARK AND MADELINE SANN, THE
PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (1996). I would like to thank Leila Sadat Wexler
for all of her superb help and to thank Jordan J. Paust and Roger S. Clark for their fine
critique and suggestions. I would also like to thank my research assistant Imelda Fisher
for her excellent work.
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INTRODUCTION

General

Some have said that the potential creation of an international
criminal court "could transform the United Nations into a third generation international organization capable of meeting the new imperatives of human security."2
3
1. Obstacles Abound

The opportunity to create an international court that provides fair,
equitable, and efficient justice is rare and important. It requires expertise in comparative and international law. Problems are serious, however. Failure to address the formidable problems could cause the Court
to run a risk of failure that could be disastrous for international law,
for the victims of the horrors that have occurred and that will occur,
and for the world. Failure could come in at least two forms: (1) the
Court could merely be a conduit for retribution after a pro-forma kangaroo court or (2) it will not have sufficient funding or expertise to
prosecute fairly, justly, and efficiently, so that all or most of the perpetrators will escape justice, unless national or regional courts take action. International law may be disparaged as meaningless. The victims
of the horrific violations of the laws of humanity will have to live with
the knowledge that the perpetrators, who flaunted the laws of humanity in the most cruel ways, walk free. The perpetrators and their victims know that fact. The cause of justice and international law or the
cause of an4 international criminal court or set of courts could be set
back badly.

This point is not to suggest that we should not go forward with
prosecuting those who commit atrocities. Rather, we should not do so
to make us feel good, but to succeed. Failure could harm not only values that we all hold to be important, but also could weaken international law. 5 The danger of failure is a mockery of international law giving impetus to those who suggest that it is not law at all! Now that
2. Richard J. Ponzio, Beyond 1995: Negotiating a New United Nations Through Article 109, 20 FLETCHER F. WoRLD ArT. 149, 152 (1996) (footnote omitted).
3. See Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1.
4. One member of the Committee felt that the risk of failure was overstated by the
author. In the views of that member, reading between the lines, the real fear of most
democratic governments (including our own) concerning the ICC is not that it will fail,
but that it will succeed - that is, that there will be established a tribunal that will be
independent enough to try to hold governments (including superpower governments) accountable. The writer of this report feels that the fear indicated in this footnote reinforces the need to make certain that the court meets the highest standard of protecting
the rights of the accused. Otherwise it will provide a rationale for opposition or refusal
to participate.
5. My point is that pretending to do something is worse than doing nothing, so we
must not allow this to be mere pretense.
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the process has begun, we owe it to ourselves and to all humanity to
make it succeed. This report will attempt to provide some insight into
some of the problems facing the creation of an international criminal
court, so that we may understand and resolve them. This report will
analyze relevant portions of the Statute of the International Law Com6
mission (ILO) for the Creation of an International Criminal Court.
Where appropriate, this piece will refer to the experiences of the Ad
Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. I will focus on
the articles and issues that I find to be of interest or about which
there is some significant discrepancy among the Statutes or those
7
which pose serious policy-based or interpretive problems.
2.

Problems Caused by Trying to Merge Two Systems

Both the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ILC Draft Statute have attempted to combine essential aspects of the so-called "adversarial" or
"common law" and "civilian" or "inquisitorial" systems. This effort is

6. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, Draft Statute of an InternationalCriminal Court, 2 May-22 July 1994, UN. GAOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft
Statute]. The Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3917th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] is currently functioning in the Hague, having indicted several persons at this writing. These indictments indude the July 11, 1996, indictment of political leader Radovan Karadzic and General
Ratko Mladic for War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia. They are each charged with genocide. See Marlise Simons, Broader Warrants Issued for 2 Bosnia Serbs, N.Y Times,
July 20, 1996, at 1, col. 1; Bruce Zagaris, Yugoslavia Tribunal Issues New Arrest Warrants Against Karadzic and Mladic and Initiates Investigation against Serbian President,, 12 INT'L ENF. L. RpmIn Issue 8, at 312 (Aug. 1996). In addition, several other Bosnian Serbs have been charged with raping at least fourteen Muslim women. Indictment
of Gagovic & Others, Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26, 1996), noted in the Aspen Institute,
Justice and Society Program,Int'l Human Rts. Update at 3 (Spring 1996). An investigation the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic currently is being undertaken by the
ICTY, The Hague, to determine whether he shares any responsibility for the atrocities
that occurred in Bosnia. See Zagaris, supra, note 6, at 314; Julius Strauss, Man of the
Sword Forged in Heat of Twisted History, THE EuROPEAN, July 18-24, 1996, at 3, col.1;
Stephen Kinzer, Hague Tribunal Weighs InternationalArrest Warrants for 2 Top Bosnia
Serbs, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1996, at A10; Jonathan Randal, Tribunal Hears Testimony
That Mladic Was at Bosnia Massacre Sites, WASH. POST, July 4, 1996, at A25, col. 4. Although the continued viability of the ICTY remains uncertain, its prospects for success
and positive impact are improving.
7. To have jurisdiction, the Tribunal must find that there has been a violation of international humanitarian law which entails individual criminal responsibility. Antonio
Cassese, President, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Memorandum, Definition of Crimes and General Principlesof CriminalLaw as Reflected in the
International Tribunal's Jurisprudence 5 (Mar. 26, 1996), at 5 [hereinafter Cassesse
Memorandum], sent to Members of Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court. See also The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I5 (Trial Chamber) [hereinafter Tadic I], Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 Oct. 1995) (Appeals
Chamber) [hereinafter Tadic II]. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to % 2 of S.C. Res. 808 (S/25704, 3 May 1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's
Report].
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laudable and ultimately ought to be done. It must be balanced very
carefully, however, with attention being paid to subtlety and detail. Institutions of different systems are not fungible. Conceptualization and
function and substance and process are often totally different in one
system from what they are in another. Examples abound: crossexamination was allowed in the Nurnberg Trials, but most German defense counsel had no experience and were incapable. Care and discretion in choice and application are required. The defense team for Mr.
Tadic in the Hague seem to be doing quite well, but, as more and more
individuals are tried, education in general may be necessary. Counsel
and judges from diverse legal systems must be taught the essentials of
the various concepts, institutions, and procedures of the systems of
which they are not generally participants.
B. Legal Basis For and Authority to Establish an Ad Hoc Tribunal or
Permanent Court
Although the following section is not directly focused directly or
solely on jurisdiction, crimes or the triggering mechanisms, it is necessary as a preliminary matter. Proper analysis of these topics depend
on the points made directly below.
1. Approaches
Several possible approaches are available: (1) tribunal created by a
statute - multilateral convention; (2) tribunal created pursuant to the
authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (either permanent or ad hoc); (3) tribunal created pursuant to the
authority of the General Assembly alone (under Article 22) or combined with that of the Security Council (per Chapter VII); (4) a tribunal created by amending the U.N. Charter, specifically calling for its
creation, in a manner similar to the International Court of Justice.
Members of the International Law Commission debated the issue of
which method would be the most appropriate and efficient.
2.

Possible Creation by the U.N. Security Council

The traditional, most authoritative, means to create a permanent
international criminal court would be by multilateral convention.8 The
Security Council, on the other hand, may have the authority, arguably,
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.9 The Security Council
took the latter approach, creating the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former
8. Secretary General's Report, supra note 7, 1 19; e.g., Charter of the Int'l Military
Tribunal or London Charter,59 Stat. 1544, 1546 (1945) [hereinafter IMT Charter].
9. See, e.g., Colin Warbrick, The United Nations System; A Place for Criminal
Courts?, 5 TRANSNATL L. & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 237 (1995); Roger S. Clark & Ved P. Nanda,
An Introduction to the Symposium on International Criminal Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CoNMp. PROBs. i (1995); Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1.
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Yugoslavia. The ILC took the conventional approach in
dation for a permanent court. It can be argued that the
Tribunals pursuant to the authority of the U.N. Charter
auspices of the Security Council is done by treaty. One
lem with this view, however, is that the U.N. Charter
self-executing in the United States.

its recommencreation of the
and under the
practical probis not seen as

The Ad Hoc Tribunals, thus, operate pursuant to the authority of
Chapter VII. It may be maintained that nations which are members of
the U.N. have agreed ab initio to abide by the will of the Security
Council when it acts consistently with its authority under the Charter.
Are non-member nations also subject to authoritative decisions of the
Security Council? Are they bound by decisions of a Tribunal created
pursuant to the authority of the Security Council? What is the authority under international law to require non-member states to abide by
such rulings? Does customary international law so provide? 10 The Tribunal and its proponents, of course, argue affirmatively."
3.

Creation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals

The Secretary-General argued that the treaty approach would
take too long and would be too arduous. Security Council Resolution
808 required quicker action,' 2 so the Secretary recommended that
Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide the basis. 3 Chapter VII covers
"Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression." The creation of the ad hoc Tribunals was thus a
"measure to maintain or restore international peace and security, following the requisite determination of the existence of a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 4 All states would be
under a binding obligation to take whatever action is required to carry
out an enforcement measure under Chapter VII. 15 The ad hoc ap-

10. See contra, e.g., GRGORY TuNm, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 123-33 (1974)
(international law is based on consent); G. vAN HoOw, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 76-82 (1983); Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1.

11. Opposing positions are put elsewhere. See, e.g., presentation in Blakesley, Obsta-

cles, supra note 1. See also, BLAKEsLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at chs. 1 & 2; A.
D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS & PROSPECT
ch. 1 (1987); Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Law?, ch. 3 in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY (1994). See also, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 6.
12. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7,
20-21.
13. kd
23.
14. Id.
22 (emphasis added).
15. Id.
23. UN Charter article 41: "[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures ... ." U.N. CHARTER, art. 41. Article 42 adds:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
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proach ought only to be a stop-gap, rather than a permanent approach;
it would be a mistake to have a series of ad hoc tribunals rather than
6
a permanent court or set of permanent (regional) courts.
C.

Individual Criminal Responsibility -

The Issue of Impunity

The following discussion is an aside, but it seems important to understanding issues of jurisdiction, crimes and triggering mechanisms.
1.

Niirnberg Principle No. I

Niirnberg Principle No. I (1946) provides the basis for the creation
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
and for a permanent international criminal court for prosecuting violations of humanitarian law. It reads: "[Amny person who commits an act
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment." As the IMT held, crimes against humanity are committed by human beings, not by abstract entities. The principle retains its currency amidst the horrors of the "modern," post-coldwar era.
Hitler emphasized the previous inability to prosecute or to sanction crimes against humanity, when at Niirnberg in 1936, he said,
"[a]nd who now remembers the Armenians?" 17 Indeed, it is particularly

blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 42. It would seem that if use of force is allowed as a "measure" under
article 42, a fortiori, the creation of an ad hoc international criminal court should be.
Will the Ad Hoc Tribunal have authority to continue its prosecutions after "peace"
and "security are restored" in the former Yugoslavia? Authority to do so depends on
whether its mandate calls for more than restoration of peace. Articles 41 and 42 seem to
provide this authority. Article 42 empowers the Security Council to restore and maintain
peace and security. This seems to include the power to create an effective war crimes tribunal to help restore or maintain peace and security. Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1;
Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International
War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267, 270 (1994). The "life-span" of the tribunal
was "linked to the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions related thereto."
See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7,
28; U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII, especially
arts. 41 & 42, discussed infra. If this means that the Tribunal will cease to exist when
"peace" and security are "restored," it may pose a serious problem and would not promote justice or restore or maintain peace or security. The term "maintenance"of peace
and security should be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal may continue to function
as long as it helps to restore or maintain peace or security. This allows prosecutions to
occur after the conflict.
16. On the other hand, a sub-set of individuals in the International Law Commission have argued that the more appropriate approach would be to allow the Security
Council to establish a new tribunal or to extend the mandate of the Yugoslav tribunal.
17. J.F. WILLS, PROLOGUE TO Nf-REMBERG 173 (1982) citing Sir Ogilvie-Forbes' report
of August 1939, with enclosures of Hitler's speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals, August 22, 1939, Great Britain, Foreign Office, DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939 (E.L. Woodward et. al., 3rd series, 9 vols. 1949-55).
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revealing that he would preface his policy of extermination of Jews,
Gypsies, Slavs and others by revealing that the absence of interest
from the world community, in effectively prosecuting such conduct and
in creating appropriate international structures to enforce this proscription, gave him the comfort of knowing that he might get away
with it, as others had in the past. This sense of impunity breeds contempt. The claimed dichotomy between peace and justice is a chimera.
It is not true and it is dangerous to suggest that somehow not punishing those who commit atrocities lends itself to peace. Even if some sort
of "peace" erupts when one side or the other of a conflict wins, the failure to bring those who have committed atrocities to justice will fester
and breed the next set.18 A fair and competent tribunal will be careful
not to indulge self-destructive Robespierrejustice.
2.

The Essence and Purpose of a Tribunal

Beccaria knew that impunity, especially for certain horrific crimes,
impeded both peace and justice: "The conviction of finding nowhere a
span of earth where real crimes were pardoned might be the most efficacious way of preventing their occurrence."' 9 Individual criminal responsibility must be the cornerstone of any international criminal
court. It is the cornerstone of any prosecution of international crime.
Article 7 of the Ad Hoc Statute explicitly provides for individual responsibility.20 The 1994 ILC Draft Statute, however, never addresses
this primordial point, although its very existence is based on its assumption. The creation of a permanent court reinforces the idea of individual criminal responsibility and provides a mechanism to fight the
tendency of some to feel impunity for conduct like the commission of

18. See BLAKESLEY, TERROmSM, supra note 1, at ch. 1.

19. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764), translated in JAMES FARRER,

CRUMES

PUNIsHMENTS 193-94 (1880).

20. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a
crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

&
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extra-judicial executions, disappearances, torture, and other gross vio21
lations of international criminal law.
II.

CRIMEs -

THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PENAL CODE

An international criminal code is crucial. The nature of international society, the sophistication and transnational nature of modem
crime, and ever increasing interdependency among States all call for
the promulgation of a new code of international crime. It may be argued that the ILC Draft Code of Crimes is too controversial, vague,
and weak to provide the needed definition and codal coherency required to comply with the principle of lggalitg or nullem poena sine
lege. Some argue that customary international law is sufficient, but
others suggest that some "customary international law offenses" are
too vague. 22 It is important that any prosecution be based on offenses
that have specific, well defined elements. Cooperation can take place
at a bilateral level, but must also take place at the multilateral level.
The member states of the Council of Europe have realized that bilateral cooperation alone is wholly insufficient. They have developed a
number of multilateral conventions on interstate cooperation in penal
matters. 23 In recent times, the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.) has embarked on the same course of conduct, for the same
reasons.
III.

STATUS AND LEGAL CAPACITY

Article 4 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute provides that the Court
would be a permanent institution. The United States would like it to
function only on an ad hoc basis.24 The ILC Draft provides for immunity of its institutions from constraints usually imposed pursuant to
state sovereignty. It "shall enjoy such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes," in the territory of each State party.25

21. See

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ESTABLISHING A JUST, FAIR AND EFFEcTrvE INTERNA-

TIONAL CRIMINAL CoUR

2 (Oct. 1994).

22. I am among those of the latter group.
23. See, e.g., EUROPEAN INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, (Ekkehart,
Mfiller-Rappard, M. Cherif and Bassiouni, 3 Vols. 1987); CHRISTINE VAN DEN WYNGAERT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994); B. RISTAU & M. ABBELL, 3 INTL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (revised 1994); PHIL FENNELL, CHRISTOPHER HARDING,
Nico JORG, & BERT SWART, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, Chs. 1819 (1995).
24. Comments of the Government of the United States of America on the Draft Articles for a Statute of an InternationalCriminal Tribunal 3 (June 1, 1994).
25. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 4(2).
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IV.

A.

JURISDICTION

Territorial & Temporal Competence

The jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is limited in time and
space. The first covers conduct occurring since January 1, 1991, in the
territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace, and territorial waters. 26 The second is
limited to breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.27 A permanent tribunal would not be so limited. Article 4 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute
provides that "[t]he Court is a permanent institution ... [which] shall
act when required to consider a case submitted to it. The Court shall
enjoy in the territory of each State party such legal capacity as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its
purpose." The Court's temporal and territorial jurisdiction, however,
may be limited by the regime of state consent and the triggering mechanism used to bring cases to the Court, as described below.
B.

JurisdictionRatione Materiae 1.

What Crimes are Covered?

Conventions, General Principles, and Customary International

Law
The sources of law and prescriptive jurisdiction for either an ad
hoc or a permanent international criminal court involve concentric circles of overlapping, possibly antagonistic or redundant prescriptive jurisdiction. Extremely complicated elements of proof and concomitant
jurisdictional prerequisites may tend to trigger even more conflict. 28
On the other hand, treaty law, general principles of a jus cogens nature and customary international law, as well as universal jurisdiction,
provide a system of laws prohibiting the conduct that most instinctively consider to be serious crimes. 29 These efforts must be articulated
clearly, as mentioned above in Part II. Generally, the statutes under
consideration in this report may be considered to cover crimes against
humanity, genocide, violations of the customary law of war, and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. These acts, in turn may include:

26. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 99 60-63; 1994 ILC Draft Statute,
supra note 6, art. 8.
27. Statute of the InternationalTribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Commited
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwanda Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, arts. 2-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1598 (1994) [hereinafter Rwanda Statute].
28. See Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 271; Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1, at 8790.
29. See, e.g., BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1 (attempting to establish
the parameters and nature of these offenses).
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inter alia; slavery; apartheid; unlawful human experimentation; torture; unlawful use of weapons; use of unlawful weapons; piracy, hijacking, and sabotage of vessels and aircraft; attacks against and
seizures of internationally protected persons; hostage taking; destruction or theft of national treasures; theft of nuclear materials; cutting
international submarine cables; and environmental harm.
The language of the statutes, arguably, also could cover violations
of customary law relating to violations of human rights, the substance
of Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949. Although the ICTY Statute language does not include common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or Protocols I and II, the language of the statutes also could cover violations of customary law relating to violations of human rights, the substance of Protocols I and II
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. The jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber, in Tadic, supports the inclusion of
common Article 3, within ICTY Statute Article 3. 30 Protocol I is cov31
ered clearly in the ILC Draft and apparently in the Rwanda Statute,
but not in that of the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Bosnia. On the other hand,
the ILC Draft's language does not specifically cover conduct prohibited
by Common Article 3 or Protocol II, which relates to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict. This deficiency is a serious one. Internal armed conflict may be the most wide-spread type of
violent conduct today. It may be considered a travesty that egregious
violations of humanitarian law may go unpunished due to this hiatus.
It is possible to argue, however, that the egregious internal conduct is
32
covered by customary international law or by jus cogens principles.

30. See Thdic Decision, U.N. Doc. LT-94-1-AR72, at 71, 137, 35 I.L.M., at 71; noted
in Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Developments: The
Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the UN GeneralAssembly, 90 AM.
J. IN . L. 491, 503 (1996).
31. UN Doc. S11995/134, at 3-4, % 12 (Secretary General's Report, regarding the
Rwanda Statute, noting that the Security Council decided "to take a more expansive appreach to the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal." Discussed in Akhavan, Current Developments, supra note 38, at 503504. The Report also suggests that the Security Council has included, therefore, "international instruments regardless of whether they were considered part of customary international law or whether they customarily have entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of the crime.' Id. at 504.
32. See, eg., argument for the existence of a common core of values and, hence, a
common core of crimes, based on jus cogens, in BLAKEsLEY, TERRORISm, supra note 1, at
ch. 1; see also, Amnesty International, supra note 21; Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of
InternationalCriminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y. 499, 504-05 (1994) [hereinafter Paust, Applicability]; Jordan J. Paust, Customary
InternationalLaw: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 59, 64-67, & authority in n. 42 (1990); OLIVER ST AL., supra note 1, at chs. 3,
16 & 17.
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2.

The Principle of Ldgalitd or nullum crimen sine lege

Although both the Ad Hoc Tribunal's Statute and the 1994 ILC
Draft Statute ostensibly incorporate this principle, they also potentially violate it. Article 39 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute provides:
An accused shall not be held guilty: (a) in the case of a prosecution
with respect referred to in article 20(a) to (d) [see infra], unless the
act or omission in question constituted a crime under international
law; (b) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred
to in article 20(e), unless the treaty in question was applicable to
the conduct of the accused; at the time the act or omission
occurred.
We will consider below, the deficiencies of both treaty and customary
international law, which ostensibly is included by reference or implication in the statutes. Essentially, the problem is that the elements of
the offenses arising out of general international law may be too vague
if their definition does not provide the elements required by international criminal and human rights law. A person may not be convicted
of a crime without explicit and specific iteration (promulgation) of the
elements to be proved. Failure to do this will end-up making a mockery of international criminal law and of the Tribunal.
The ICTY Statute, commentary to Article 1 (Competence of the Tribunal), and Article 2, do a better job at providing more explicitly and
adroitly the elements of the proscribed conduct, although there are
still deficiencies. Article 1 proscribes "serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991." The Commentary (really the Secretary-General's
Report on this point) provides that:
The international tribunal shall prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law

...

While

there is international customary law which is not laid down in conventions, some of the major conventional humanitarian law has become part of customary international law.
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the
principle nullem crimen sine lege requires that the international
tribunal should apply rules .

.

. which are, beyond any doubt, part

of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not
all States to specific conventions does not arise ....
The part of
conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond
doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal of 8 August 1945 [Nfiremberg] [footnotes omitted].
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This analysis is correct, but it does not go far enough. It is necessary that the particular offense be proscribed clearly (i.e., not vaguely)
by a treaty or by some other authoritative source of international law,
e.g., jus cogens principles or customary international law. The wording
of the commentary and of the statutes themselves may not measure
up. This deficiency pervades both Ad Hoc Statutes and the ILC Draft
Statute. The deficiency is potentially devastating! Professor Bassiouni
and other international criminal law experts who understand both the
international law and the criminal law issues, have resolved some, but
not all of the problems. Ad Hoc Statute Articles 2-5, provide an example at some criminal law input and these articles are much better than
the prescriptions in the ILC Draft, which apparently were adopted
without much input from experts in the criminal law.
C. Crimes-PrescriptiveJurisdiction:Content of HumanitarianLaw
and Catalogue of Offenses
1.

The Ad Hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Article 1, Competence of the International Tribunal, reads: "The
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute."33 This authority
derives from the mandate set out in paragraph 1 of S.C. Res. 808
(1993). It is interesting to note that humanitarian law has traditionally included the Hague and Geneva rules. Is the nature and content of
this changing? Article 2 then lists, as punishable offenses, committing
or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the relevant Geneva
Convention specified below:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
[apparently it must be both wanton and unlawful];
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces
of a hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;3'

33. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, arts. 1-5; see also id.
33-49.
34. One cannot help but notice some potential for inconsistency here. In a military
trial in Bosnia, the defendants were convicted after confessing, but their confessions
were not corroborated and defendants claimed that they were issued under torture and
repeated beating, which seemed to be corroborated by medical evidence. If a trial is egregiously unfair, do the statutes of the Tribunals allow for prosecution of those who were
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(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian; and
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Article 3 specifies that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute
"violations of the laws or customs of war" and illustratively lists:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
Article 4, Genocide, provides:
1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of persons committing any of the other acts enumerated in
paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.
Article 5, Crimes Against Humanity, reads:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed

responsible for violations of rights in trials such as that which take place in war-ravaged
places? See Bosnia Convicts and Sentences to Death 2 Serbs, 9 INT'L L. REP. 147 (No.9,
Apr. 1993); John F. Burns, 2 Serbs Shot for Killings and Rapes, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 31,
1993, A6, col.4; David B. Ottaway, Bosnia Convicts 2 Serbs in War Crimes Trial, WASH.
PoST, Mar. 31, 1993, A21, col.1. Certainly, the fairness of the trials must be ensured, but
will prosecution for unfair trials apply to all sides? Jim Nafziger notes that, indeed, the
power of individuals in the U.N. Forces or in the employ of the Tribunal might be such
that it could be abused. The system should ensure the sanction of those who so abuse
their power. This is discussed infra at notes 110-112, and accompanying text.
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conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
i) other inhumane acts.
Article 4 provides for jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and
Article 5 covers crimes against humanity. Note, the last item on the
list is "other inhumane acts."35 The Statute takes some license on
"crimes against humanity," adding some that are not included in the
Geneva Convention (IV), but which are in the Genocide Convention.
Although Geneva law covers inhumane or inhuman acts, these phrases
may still be too vague and imprecise. Does this vagueness pose a potential violation of the principle or legality or nullum crimen sine lege?
Whatever conduct is covered must be clearly and explicitly proscribed
by relevant international law.6 The Rwanda Statute does not require
that the inhumane acts occur in armed conflict. With twenty-two categories of international crimes represented in 314 international instruments enacted between 1815 and 1988, many of which do not properly
define in criminal law terms the offenses proscribed or provide their
elements, it is necessary that the offenses be codified or otherwise
clearly defined. Some of the vagueness may have been eliminated by
customary international law or by general principles arising out of do37
mestic refinement of the ambiguous terms of treaties.
Articles 2-5 of the ICTY Statute, provide that the Tribunal shall
have jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes
against humanity.38 The Secretary General's Report notes that only

35. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5 (I). The Rwanda Tribunal Statute, art. 6(c),
unlike the ICTY Statute, art. 5, requires expressly that the prosecution prove that the
enumerated "inhumane acts" be committed against a civilian population, "on national,
political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds." See discussion on Genocide, infra.
36. See, eg., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1942); quoted in the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Opinion, Oct. 1, 1946, reprintedin 44 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 172, 220 (1947).
37. This is what the United States and many other countries did with hostage taking and hijacking, for example.
38. On crimes against humanity, see generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (1992); and Roger Clark, Crimes

Against Humanity, ch. 7, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (Ginsburgs
& Kudriavtsev eds., 1990). See also Jordan Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nuremberg: Crimes Against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and National Fora, 12 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTs. 547 (1996) (arguing that many of these crimes are defined clearly enough)
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crimes which have clearly and beyond any doubt become part of customary law may be prosecuted. 39 How much this helps any legality
problem is still open to some discussion, but it is intended to include
the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, and the Regulations annexed thereto. 40 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948; 41 and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945.42 It certainly would
include more, but this would have to be established and the elements
clarified.4 3
Although the ICTY Statute, Article 2, makes reference to Protocols
I and II and to the Geneva Conventions, a question still could be
raised as to whether the conflict on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia is international or internal and as to what exact impact this determination will have.
Article 3 does not specifically address rape as such, but rape is
covered in other provisions, such as ICTY 5(g). Crimes against humanity were explicitly recognized in the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment
and in Control Council Law No. 10." These rules have clearly become
part of customary international law and indeed, articulate "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations."" Rape is not listed in
the Nairnberg Charter, but is listed in Control Council Law No. 10,
which also deleted "in execution of in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."" In Indictment of Gagovic & Others,
Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26, 1996), the ICTY indicted eight Serbian
military, paramilitary and police men, charging them with raping fourteen Muslim women. This is the first time that rape has been charged
as a specific and separate indictable war crime. The indictment details

[hereinafter Paust, Threats to Accountability].
39. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 1 34 & 35.
40. Hague Convention (No.IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and the Regulations annexed thereto, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
41. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
42. IMT Charter, supra note 8. Secretary General's Report, supra note 7,
37-49
spells out these various offenses.
43. See, eg., Paust, Threats to Accountability, supra note 38.
44. See Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, T 47. Letter from the late Frank C.
Newman to Professor Blakesley, September 21, 1993.
45. See Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice, at art. 38, 91 1(c); BLAKESLEY,
TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
48. For a general discussion, see M.Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual
Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia, Occasional Paper No. 1,
(DePaul Intl Hum. Rts. Inst. 1996)]. Furthermore, "[a]trocitiesand offenses included but
not limited to [murder, etc.]" was substituted for "namely" and a specific list. Thanks to
the late Justice Frank C. Newman for this latter point. See also Paust, Applicability,
supra note 32, at 516-17; JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS

1020-21 (1996).
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acts of sexual assault, charging the perpetrators with committing
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
47
and of violating the laws or customs of war.
Crimes against humanity include crimes aimed at any civilian
population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an international or internal armed conflict. 4s Questions are
raised by some of the language of the ICTY Statute. Other inhumane
acts of a very serious nature, proscribed by relevant international law,
refer to such as wilful killing, torture, or rape against any civilian population on political, racial, or religious grounds. Does ICTY Article 5's
phrase "in armed conflict" mean during armed conflict? Why does Article 5(1), unlike control Council Law No. 10, use the term "crimes" instead of "atrocities and offenses" and "directed against" instead of
"committed against" and why does (2) delete "including but not limited
to?"49 Finally, to be consistent with Law No. 10, indicated above, Article 5 of the statute should have concluded as follows: "(g) rape, or (h)
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population or (i)
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds." In the conflict in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts have taken
the form of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and widespread and systematic
50
rape and other forms of sexual assault, including forced prostitution.
The tribunal, thus, has the authority to prosecute persons responsible
for the indicated crimes - murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial,
and religious grounds; other inhumane acts - when committed in an
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character and directed against any civilian population.5 1
2.

The 1994 ILC Draft Statute

Article 20 provides that,
the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) genocide;
(b) aggression;
(c) serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict;
(d) crimes against humanity;

47. Indictment of Gagovic & Others, Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26, 1996), noted in
the Aspen Institute, Justice and Society Program,Int'l Human Rts. Update at 3 (Spring

1996).
48. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, $ 47.

49. Again, thanks to Frank Newman.
50. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, $ 48. See Bassiouni & McCormick,
supra note 46.
51. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 9 49, citing ICTY Statute art. 5.
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(e) crimes, established under or pursuant to the treaty provision
listed in the Annex, which, having regard to the conduct alleged,
constitute exceptionally serious crimes of international concern.
The strategy of the ILC contemplated having the treaty as the instrument for defining what was proscribed and punishable under the Statute. While accepting treaty as the primary source, it went beyond the
definitions in the treaty in incorporating by reference other crimes derived from other sources. Other sources include: crimes under general
international law, and certain crimes "under national law," aimed at
enabling the so-called "suppression conventions." 2 These incorporate or
call upon notions of both customary international law and general
principles of international law. The "Mercenaries Convention" (not yet
in force) is excluded, but the Narcotics Convention, the Torture Convention, and, the Genocide, Hijacking, crimes against internationally
protected persons, war crimes, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and Protocol I to the Geneva latter conventions and the Apartheid
Convention are all included.
The inclusion of the term offenses against "general international
law," which was in the prior draft, was controversial within the ILC
and was eventually removed. Some such crimes may still be included,
if one deems custom and general principle to be a source of criminal
law. These are crimes falling within "a norm of international law accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as being of such a fundamental character that its violation attracts the criminal responsibility of individuals." 53 These are the socalled common core of crimes.54 The referenced conduct is certainly
criminal, but the problem and controversy relate to the term itself and
the often vague and defective nature of the definition of these offenses
in international law. Specificity of elements and definition is not often
significantly improved by extant conventions. International criminal
law conventions have often been negotiated and drafted by international lawyers sometimes unfamiliar with criminal law. Hence, the
rigid and rigorous requirements of criminal law and criminal justice
have often been wanting. Specific elements must be clear so that they
may be proved by the evidence. This undertaking requires generally an
actus reus and a mens rea, which combine to cause a specifically pro-

52. Crawford, supra note 1, at 143.
53. See Crawford, supra note 1, at 144; BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1
& 3.
54. For elaboration and analysis of the common core of crimes, see BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at ch. 1; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
305 (2nd ed. 1979); BAssIOUNI, supra note 38, at 470-98; Int'l Committee of the Red
Cross, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 To THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 9J3539 (1987). The problem of whether crimes established by custom are part
of U.S. federal "common law" is troublesome. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack A. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997).
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hibited social harm. Crimes must be promulgated with specificity, either in treaties or in implementing legislation or even in judicial interpretation of the broad or vague standards so as to create sufficiently
clear and provable material elements. If the definition and elements
are wanting, however, conviction violates human rights law. The listing of crimes in Article 20 (a)-(e) is some improvement but still not
sufficient.
With respect to war crimes, Article 20 of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute may be sufficiently broad to cover offenses prohibited under the
terms of Protocols I and II. It clearly covers Protocol I. On the other
hand, the ILC Draft's failure to include acts prohibited by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or by Protocol II is unfortunate. 55 It
is possible that Article 20(c) of the ILC Draft, which reads: "serious violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflict . . ." is
broad enough to include violations of humanitarian law in both international and non-international armed conflict.5
Article 21(1)(a) calls for inherent jurisdiction over genocide. Professor Wedgwood argues persuasively, however, that genocide is difficult
to define. 57 These offenses are intimidating to any judge and risk injustice, because their complexity and difficulty increases geometrically
each time an element of proof is added, especially when each element
is vague. 58 For example, argues Professor Wedgwood, the "specific intent" element for genocide, "intent to destroy in whole or in part" a re59
ligious, ethnic, national, or racial group, is very difficult to establish.

55. But see Paust, Applicability, supra note 32, at 511-12 & 512 n.40 (grave
breaches provisions can reach common Article 3).
56. See Amnesty International,supra note 21, at 11; Paust, Threats to Accountability, supra note 38.
57. Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 271. Article 3 of the Ad Hoc Statute refers to the
"violations of the laws or customs of war," which some argue has traditionally referred to
violations of humanitarian law in internationalarmed conflict, essentially those offenses
stemming from the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, its annexed Regulations, and the
Geneva Conventions. See Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1, at 88; Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 12. Secretary of State (then-Ambassador) Albright and others
have argued that Article 3 of the Ad Hoc Tribunal is broad enough to include offenses
such as those covered by common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Ambassador Albright, Statement, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 15 (25 May 1993), quoted in Theodor Meron,
War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
78, 82 (1994); PAUST ET AL, supra note 46, at 969, 975-76, 991-94. To cover the conduct
in Rwanda, the applicable standards must apply to offenses which occur in internal
armed conflict. For this to occur under the current Ad Hoc Tribunal rules, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II can be applied by extension
via customary international law orjus cogens, see Amnesty International,supra note 21,
at 12; ICTY, supra note 6, art. 4 (referring to Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol
II in a non-exhaustive list, and applicable as part of the "laws of war" or "humanitarian
law."). See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Nullum Crimen and Related Crimes, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& PoL'Y328 (arguing that it is neither difficult to define nor to prosecute.)
58. Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 271.
59. Id. Note US. Reservations and Understandings Relating to the Convention on
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The difficulty is evident, for example, in circumstances where a given
commander is charged with specifically intending to destroy, in whole
or in part, a relevant group, when the evidence indicates that his
soldiers ran amok. Generally, there will be no relevant contemporaneous statements from the commanders or from the soldiers.6 0 Proving
specific intent to kill is one thing; proving the specific invidious intent
required for genocide is another.
3.

Distinction between "internal" and "international" conflicts

In October 1995, the Appellate Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal
affirmed the Trial Chamber's ruling, rejecting defendants Tadic's, defense that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction because the conflict was
civil, not international, and noted that there has been a gradual blurring of the distinction between the customary international law rules
governing international conflicts and those governing internal conflicts.61 President Cassese interprets: there has been a "convergence of
two bodies of international law with the result that internal strife is
now governed to a large extent by the rules and principles which had
traditionally only applied to international conflicts."62 To arrive at this
conclusion to protect the participants in hostilities by application of international humanitarian law rules, the Appellate Chamber considered
the practice of various states and the interpretations and practice of
various international, including regional, organizations. 63 President
Cassese summarizes the Appellate Chamber's position as follows:
"[T]his convergence has come about due largely to the following four
factors: (1) the increase in the number of civil conflicts; (2) the increase in the level of cruelty of internal conflicts; (3) the increasing interdependence of States; and (4) the influence of universal human
rights standards."64

Genocide, 1989, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 779, 782.
60. Id. Of course for criminal responsibility for lesser forms of the offenses discussed
in this report are possible upon proof of a lesser mens rea. E.g., criminal liability based
upon command responsibility may be established by proving that the commander "knew
or had reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof" ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.3.
61. Tadic I, supra note 7; Tadic II, supra note 7; see also Cassese Memorandum,
supra note 7.
62. Cassese Memorandum, supra note 7, at 5.
63. Id. citing Tadic I, supra note 7,
100, 102, 104, 108, including its consideration of State practice during the Spanish Civil War; the practice of States applying parts
of the Geneva Conventions, per common Article 3; the unilateral willingness of States to
abide by international humanitarian law in their internal conflicts; and actions of the
ICRC; UN General Assembly Resolutions; declarations made by Member States of the
European Union; Additional Protocol II of 1977; and some military manuals. Obviously
some of these are problematical on several counts, including their persuasiveness toward
the creation of international custom.
64. Id. citing Tadic II, supra note 7, 1 97.
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Some argue that this broad proposition of jurisdictional interpretation as applied to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute or any other statute for
a permanent international criminal court, raises some difficulty. Sovereignty concerns, among others, certainly will be raised. 65 President
Cassese puts several limitations to the expanse of the blurring of civil
and international strife:
(1) only a number of rules and principles governing international
armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal
conflicts and (2) this extension has not taken place in the form of
full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts;
rather the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal
conflicts.66
President Cassese notes that the 1994 ILC Draft Statute is
broader than the Statute for the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Whereas the Appellate Chamber in the Tadic case considered armed
conflict to be a trigger of jurisdiction, it was not necessary that the
armed conflict be occurring at the time or in the place of the crime. 67
ILC Draft Statute Article 20(d) (crimes against humanity) and Rwanda
Statute Article 3 cover the same ground as Article 5 of the Yugoslav
Tribunal Statute, but do not require any nexus to armed conflict. The
statutes are broader, therefore, and any distinction between internal
versus international conflict becomes irrelevant.
4. Is there a gap in the coverage of conduct in internal armed
conflict in relation to Common Article 3 and Protocol II?
Is there conduct that constitutes a crime against humanity, but is
not covered by the 1994 ILC Draft Statute? It should be emphasized
that crimes against humanity are not limited necessarily to conduct
against civilian populations.6 Crimes against humanity in the 1994
ILC Draft Statute are not and should not be linked to War Crimes.
The commentary to ILC Draft Article 20, defines crimes against humanity as: "inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or systematic violation aimed at the civilian population in
whole or in part." Professor Paust considers this language needlessly

65. James Podgers, Cover Story: The World Cries Out for Justice, 82 A.BAJ. 52, 62
(Apr. 1996).
66. Cassese Memorandum, supra note 7, at 6. President Cassese does not elaborate.
I am not at all sure what this means or whether it is meaningful at all. I worry about
prosecuting "general essences."
67. Id. at 7, citing Tadic H, supra note 7, $ 70.
68. See Amnesty International,supra note 21, at 13; PAUST ET AL, supra note 46, at
1028-31, 1035, 1062, 1075-78; Cf Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4; Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US.) 1984
I.C.J. 392; Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 6, however does require the civilian population nexus.
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limiting of responsibility recognized under the customary instruments
pertaining to crimes against humanity. 9 The commentary to the ICTY
Statute suggests and Rwanda Statute Article 6(e) explicitly provides,
that the above-noted language applies to crimes based on "national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."70 There is no reason that
such a limitation should apply and the commentary in that regard
should be ignored. International law today is not limited in application
to crimes against the peace or war crimes, as the judges at Nirnberg
worried. 71 Control Council Law No. 10, provided that "[a]trocities and
offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on po72
litical, racial or religious grounds . . . [are punishable]."
Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier subsequently were prosecuted for
crimes against humanity independent of any crimes against the peace
or war crimes. 73 The Commission of Experts on Rwanda concluded that
crimes against humanity need not be connected to crimes against the
peace or war crimes. 74 The 1994 ILC Draft Statute also refers to the
crime of torture as defined in the UN Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN.
Torture Convention). The Annex also includes reference to Apartheid
and offenses relating to hijacking, sabotage, and other terrorist offenses. The U.S. Government has been opposed to Apartheid being
included.
5. Distinction between "War Crimes" and "Crimes against
Humanity"
President Cassese notes that the distinction has become concrete.
Professor Orentlicher notes that

69. Paust, Threats to Accountability, supra note 38.
70. Amnesty International,supra note 21, at 14. This is similar to Rwanda Statute,
supra note 27, art. 6(c), which explicitly requires this criteria.
71. Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; Meron, supra note 57, at 85; Amnesty International, supra note 21, at 14.
72. Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; Amnesty International,supra note 21, at 14;
Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court
of Cassation:From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289
(1994).
73. Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier
for Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAw & SOcIAL INQ. 191 (1995); Wexler, Interpretation, supra note 72; Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; see also Justice Case (Case
3), under Control Council Law No. 10.
74. Rwanda Statute, art. 3; Commission of Experts on Rwanda, PreliminaryReport
of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security
Council Resolution 935 at 26-27 (Sept. 29, 1994), reported in Amnesty International,
supra note 21, at 15.
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[Un the International Law Commission's fourth report on the draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, its
Special Rapporteur asserted that the autonomy of crimes against
humanity from war crimes has now become absolute. Today, crimes
against humanity can be committed not only within the context of
armed conflict, but also independently of any such conflict.. .. 75
Of course, the same conduct during an armed conflict might, nonetheless, constitute both a war crime and a crime against humanity.
6. Vagueness & Inconsistency Statutes

A Serious Weakness in Both

Vagueness in some aspects of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute is even
more serious than that of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The ILC Draft Statute prohibits systematic or mass violations of human rights, aggression, genocide, torture (listed in the text of article 20 in the commentary or in the Annex), and "serious crimes of international concern."
This last phrase is vague. According to some, the articles incorporate
by reference the criminal law weaknesses in those treaty "offenses"
and fail to specify the mental state required for conviction and punishment. The mental state may vary, depending on the particular offense.
It is also argued that they also fail to specify adequately the nature
and scope of the defenses. The applicability of national law to instances in which the treaty does not define an offense with sufficient
precision may play an important role. The ICTY Statute commentary
76
recognizes the need for clarification.
National law, to the extent that it creates general principle or custom, may provide a valuable means to establish or to recognize the elements or definition of crimes in relation to procedural and evidentiary
rules, as well as to constitutional or human rights concerns. National
law is important for the omnipresent question of what is international
law? The elements of any specific offense charged perhaps may be established not only by customary international law, but also by general
principles determined by a comparative analysis of the law of all
states. This proposed foundation has particular relevance for criminal
law, because the law of virtually all nations requires clear definition
and specific material elements. These criteria may be seen as general
principles of international law. The Tribunals must apply them. These
general principles, even as custom, may establish the elements of the
relatively small common core of crimes subject to prosecution before
77
the Tribunal.

75. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to ProsecuteHuman Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2589 (1991); Mariann Meier Wang, The
InternationalTribunal for Rwanda: Opportunitiesfor Clarification, Opportunitiesfor Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 177, 226, n. 180 (1995).
76. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, at 15, 1 72

77. Some elucidation of this idea is found in BLAKEsLEY,

TERRORISM,

supra note 1, at
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V.

TRIGGER MECHANISMS & JURISDICTION

ILC Statute Article 21 provides the trigger mechanism or sets the
preconditions for jurisdiction to be exercised. This trigger or these preconditions relate to Articles 20 (crimes), 25 (genocide), and 22-28 (acceptance of jurisdiction).
A. States' Acceptance of Jurisdiction,Based on Principles of Prescriptive Jurisdiction.ILC Statute Articles 21-28
1.

States, the Security Council, and the General Assembly

For a court to be independent and viable, it must be the judge of
its own jurisdiction. Article 24 so provides. Article 21 outlines the ways
states accept the Court's jurisdiction. A state party may express its
consent to be bound by declaration lodged with the depositary [Art.
22(1)(a)]. Alternatively, a state may accept the Court's jurisdiction by
declaration lodged with the Registrar with respect to Article 20 crimes
[Art.22(1)(b)]. A state's declaration of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction may be general or may be limited to particular conduct or to
conduct that occurred during a particular period of time [Art.22(2)].
When a declaration is made accepting the court's jurisdiction for a
specified period, it may not be withdrawn before that period ends. If
the declaration is for an unspecified period, six-months notice is required for withdrawal. Withdrawal will not affect proceedings commenced prior to the withdrawal's effective date [Art.22(3)]. Under Article 21, if acceptance of a state which is not party to the statute is
required, that state may consent to the Court's jurisdiction by lodging
its acceptance with the Registrar [Art. 22(4)].
Article 23 provides for the Security Council to refer Article 20
crimes to the Court pursuant to U.N. Charter Chapter VII. Acts of aggression may not be so referred, unless the Security Council has first
determined that such an act occurred. The Court may not commence
prosecution of any conduct related to an "act of aggression or breach of
the peace under Chapter VII," being "dealt with by the Security Council," unless the Security Council "otherwise decides." 7T
2.

Controversy over triggering mechanisms

In the ILC itself, concerns were raised over what institutions,
States, or individuals should be allowed to trigger the Court. With regard to the Security Council, some delegations worried that the process could undermine the role of the Security Council in dispute resolution. Others were concerned that the statute might confer more
authority on the Security Council than it had already under the U.N.

ch. 1.
78. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 23.
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Charter. Others worried that the relationship between the Court and
the Security Council could undermine the judicial independence and
integrity of the Court or the sovereign equality of states. 79
Should submissions of cases to the court be limited to StatesParties? This limitation would encourage membership, but may restrict prosecution. Who should have discretion to limit acceptance of
cases? How broad should that discretion be? The significant powers of
the Security Council have emerged as formidable in the context of the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Does the Statute of
the ILC Court provide the capacity to expand or to restrict Security
Council power? Some ILC members felt that situations in which Chapter VII was at issue rather than other cases ought to be signaled to
the Court by the Council. If the Council can do more than refer to
such situations, it was argued, what would happen to the independence of the Procuracy or the Court itself? Dangers of influence on the
Procuracy, inequality of treatment or justice, especially given the possibility of a Security Council veto, gave pause to several on the ILC. °
3. Should the General Assembly be able to refer cases to the Tribunal?
The General Assembly is the primary organ of the U.N. and, arguably, the most representative body. It has primary authority, moreover, in matters of human rights and residual competence in matters of
international peace and security. It has the facility of acting when the
Security Council cannot because of the veto. On the other hand, what
are the legal consequences of a General Assembly decision to refer a
criminal case? Does a General Assembly Resolution have even similar
authority? Should state consent be required before a case is submitted
to the Court? Should ad hoc consent of the state which has custody of
the accused be required? Consent would seem necessary. Consent
should be necessary before the Tribunal or its organs could conduct
any investigation inside a particular country. This requirement is true
for cases referred by the Security Council as well. States, however,
could consent in advance by treaty to such investigations and to
render any fugitive to the tribunal. Cooperation in the traditional
sense should be required. Anything less would raise the specter of diminished sovereignty to the point that opposition would overwhelm
adoption. Some offenses, such as genocide, ought to trigger inherent
79. U.N.G.A., Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Summary of the Proceedings of the PreparatoryCommittee During the
Period 25 March - 12 April 1996 at 39, A/AC.249/1, 7 May 1996 (Rapporteur, Mr. Jun
Yoshida).
80. See ILC, Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Sixth Session, Ch. 1, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace & Security of Mankind, at 11 (2 May - 24 July 1994), U.N. Doc. A/CN4/L.496, 13, 17 (1994) [hereinafter
Draft Report].
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jurisdiction in the Tribunal. Inherent jurisdiction over the conduct,
however, would not obviate the necessity of cooperation both from the
theoretical and the practical point of view. There is also some question
as to which offenses will trigger inherent jurisdiction. Is "aggression"
part of the prerequisite base? Multiplicity of concurrent jurisdiction
and the risk of harassment prosecution will cause some states to be
hesitant.
B. Competence Ratione
Responsibility l

Personae

and Individual Criminal

1. The Ad Hoc Statute and hierarchy of jurisdiction
Yugoslav Ad Hoc Statute, Article 6 reads: "[Tihe International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present statute." Are juridical, non-natural, persons subject to jurisdiction? 2 The Secretary General recommended against
jurisdiction over juridical persons, such as associations or organizations and against jurisdiction based solely on membership in such organizations.83 The Secretary General's Report, moreover, provides that
jurisdiction and responsibility are to attach on the basis of individual,
not vicarious or imputed liability.8 The ILC Statute provides similarly.8s Command responsibility, however, does not contradict this provision. 8 Command responsibility does obtain liability, and ought to, for
lesser versions or degrees of the offenses discussed herein, based on a
lesser mens rea. For example, criminal liability for an manslaughter
type homicide based upon command responsibility may be established
by proving that the commander "knew or had reason to know that his
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
87
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."
2. More Specifics on Triggers
ILC Draft Statute Article 21, "Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction," reads:
[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction over a person with respect
to a crime referred to in article 20 (supra), if-

81. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7,

9

50-52.

82. Id. 9 50.
83. Id. 951.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 20-30.
86. But see, PAUST r AL, supra note 46, at 22-23, 32-43, passim.
87. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.3; cf, Irwin Cotler & Judith Hippler Bello, Regina v. Finta, Comment on Canadian Supreme Court War Crimes Decision, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 460 (1996).
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(b) in any . . . case [other than genocide, where there is inherent
jurisdiction per Arts. 21(a) and 25] . . . a complaint is brought
under Article 25 (2) and the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to the crime is accepted under Article 22:
(i) by the State which has custody of the suspect... ('the custodial
State'); and
(ii) by the State on the territory of which the act or omission in
question occurred.
2. If, with respect to a crime to which T 1(b) applies, the custodial
state has received, under an international agreement, a request
from another State to surrender a suspect for the purposes of prosecution, then, unless the request is rejected, the acceptance by the
requesting State of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the
crime is also required.
In other words, the consent of both the State on whose territory the offense occurred, the state on whose territory the defendant is now
found and even the state whose nationals were injured or killed by the
accused must consent.
3.

Ceded Jurisdiction

The ILC Draft Statute operates on the basis of what might be
called "ceded jurisdiction," except in relation to genocide.s Except for
genocide, for which the Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction, jurisdiction
applies to the set of offenses indicated by Article 20, if the suspect is
present within the territory of the state of his nationality, of the state
in which the offense was committed or if his extradition has been approved to a state having a proper basis of jurisdiction, the consent of
each of those states is required.89 Consent, thus, is the apparent basis
of the Tribunal's binding authority. On the other hand, ILC Statute,
Article 23 provides that notwithstanding Article 21 (preconditions to
exercise of jurisdiction, infra), the Court has jurisdiction in accordance
with this Statute with respect to crimes referred to in Article 20
(crimes within the court'sjurisdiction), as a consequence of referral by
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The Security Council, therefore, may refer cases to the ILC Tribunal,
thus triggering priority jurisdiction. Of course, the very statutes of the
Ad Hoc Tribunals are based on Security Council authority pursuant to
Chapter VII. Ultimately, as is the case with any independent judicial
body, the Tribunal is the judge of its own jurisdiction, although one
could argue that ceded jurisdiction in some forms negates this
principle. 90

88. See Crawford, supra note 1, at 143.
89. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, arts. 20-22 especially art. 21; see Crawford, supra note 1, at 143-44.
90. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 24; See The Norwegian Loaus
Case, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (especially Judge Lauterpacht's separate opinion), discussed in OLIVER ET AL., supra note 1, at 48-53.
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Ceded jurisdiction under ILC Statute Article 22 operates in a
manner similar to that of the International Court of Justice. A state
party may consent to jurisdiction in a wholesale manner at the moment it becomes a party to the Convention.9 It may agree to the Tribunal's jurisdiction only for certain offenses. 92 The state may agree at
some time later than when it became a party to the treaty, by so indicating in a declaration lodged with the Registrar.9 3 Here, it may accept
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court for all covered offenses or
the offenses indicated in its declaration. 9 A declaration may even be
made for a specified period of time; however, the state may not withdraw during the indicated period unless it gives six-months notice of
intent to withdraw.95 Withdrawal does not affect proceedings already
commenced at the time of the notice. 96 Article 22(4) allows a non-stateparty to consent to jurisdiction in a given case only for a particular
crime, by declaration lodged with the registrar or a complaint tendered
to the Tribunal. 97 The United States is opposed to this latter
provision.9"
4. Jurisdiction and the U.N. Security Council
The ICTY operates pursuant to the authority of U.N. Charter
Chapter VII. It may be maintained that nations which are members of
the UN have agreed ab initio to abide by the will of the Security
Council when it acts consistently with its authority under the Charter.
Some questions arise. Are non-member nations also subject to authoritative decisions of the Security Council? Are they bound by decisions of
a Tribunal created pursuant to the authority of the Security Council?
What is the authority under international law to require non-member
states to abide by such rulings? Does customary international law so
provide? 99 The Tribunal and its proponents, of course, argue
affirmatively. 100

91. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 22(a). See the general discussion
r
supra note 1, at 40-66.
in OLVER ETAL,
92. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 22(1) & (3).
93. Id. art. 22(lXb).

Id.
Id. art. 22(3).
Id.
See id. arts. 26 & 22.
US. Report, supra note 24, at 14.
99. See contra, eg., TuNKiN, supra note 10;. VAN HOOF, supra note 10; Blakesley,
Obstacles, supra note 1.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

100. Opposing positions are put elsewhere. See, eg., authority in Blakesley, Obsta-

cles, supra note 1. See also BLAKESLEY, TERROIuSm, supra note 1, at chs. 1 & 2; Anthony
D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS & PROSPECT
1 (1987); Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Law?, ch. 3 in INTERNATONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY (1994).
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C. ObtainingJurisdictionover the Accused, Correlationof Prescriptive
and Enforcement Jurisdiction
There is obligation under both the Ad Hoc and the ILC Statutes to
"bring to justice, to extradite, or to transfer the alleged fugitive," e.g.,
1994 ILC Draft Statute Article 53(2)(c). Article 22 of the 1994 Draft
Statute deals with submitting to the Tribunal's Jurisdiction, and opting in and out.
All States Parties apparently must cooperate with the Tribunal
upon a request to prosecute for the crime of genocide. 10 1 All States who
have accepted the Court's jurisdiction for international crime in general apparently must cooperate with a request to arrest and to transfer an accused to the Court albeit with exceptions.'02 If a State has not
accepted the Court's jurisdiction for offenses listed in the Annex (e.g.,
torture, or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol I), it must either transfer the accused to the Court or
extradite him to a nation that will prosecute him or prosecute him itself. 0 3 For other circumstances, the state party must determine
whether its own law and constitution will allow it to transfer, extradite or prosecute the requested individual. 1 4
The premise of the ILC Report was to promote the widest possible
acceptance of jurisdiction and to require certain elements of cooperation, even when jurisdiction was rejected in a given instance.'l 5 Nevertheless, acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction created disagreement
within the ILC Working Group. The appropriateness of ad hoc acceptance and the form that it might take is at the bottom of this disagreement. 1'6 An early draft provided for an 'opting in" approach modeled
after Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
This approach would have allowed a state to "opt in" at any time, on
the basis of a specific offense having been committed. 0 7 For example,
Libya could have accepted jurisdiction of the Court for the suspects in
the Lockerbie incident. Here, U.S. or U.K. consent apparently would
not have been required, although Libya's consent would be required
before its nationals could be prosecuted before the Tribunal.'08 This approach would have avoided the problem that most continental nations
and those whose law and constitutions follow the continental tradition

101. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(2)(aXI).
102. Id. art. 53(2)(a)(ii).
103. See id. 53(2Xb).
104. See generally Amnesty International,supra note 21, at 18-19.
105. Crawford, supra note 1, at 144; See eg., Articles 58(1), 62, 63(3Xc), and 65. See
Working Group Report on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Annex
to Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session,
UN. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 255, UN. Doc. A/48110 (1993).
106. See generally Crawford, supra note 1, at 144.

107. Id.
108. Id.; see 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 24(1)(a) & (2).
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which requires a state to refuse to extradite its own nationals.' °9 On
the other hand, a second alternative, "opting out," would require a
state to declare, with at least six months notice, that it will no longer
be subject to jurisdiction of the Tribunal."10 Finally, the ILC Draft
adopted a position in which a State has the right and the obligation to
send the fugitive to the court, to extradite or to prosecute [Art. 53
(2),(3)-(6)]. If a State has a basis of jurisdiction to prosecute and has
requested extradition and had the request approved, that State's consent is also needed. [Art. 21 (2)(6)]. Article 53 of the ILC Statute requires all states parties to cooperate in matters related to the Statute.
In fact, jurisdiction of the ILC Court is designed to be integrated into
the extant framework of international cooperation in criminal matters.
There is some debate over whether an International Tribunal ought to
be the mechanism of last resort; to become activated when the pertinent state that otherwise has jurisdiction either refuses or otherwise
cannot either prosecute or extradite the fugitive."' Consent to jurisdiction in some form appears to be required for offenses other than
genocide." 2
Some members of the ILC felt that the rule on submission to jurisdiction being required for genocide and voluntary as to other offenses
set the appropriate balance between an aggressive or ambitious versus
a more cautious approach. Others argued that this approach was too
timid. They felt that the Tribunal ought to have a limited inherent jurisdiction for a common core of the most serious offenses, at least
when the jurisdictional state was either unwilling or unable to prosecute or extradite. This more vigorous option raised the fear of abuse
for political reasons and the potential for human rights violations. Still
others felt that the Statute ought to provide simply a facility for states
to supplement rather than to supplant their domestic jurisdiction.
Some felt that the Tribunal ought to have the authority to decline a
case if it felt that it was of insufficient gravity and could be handled
by the domestic court."3 The States-parties, at any rate, have obligations under the Statute (pursuant to Articles 22-24 and Article 53).
The Court's capacity to exercise jurisdiction, however, may be undermined by the mechanisms for opting out, in Article 53.
D. Enforcement Jurisdiction
The ILC Draft provides in Article 4, that the "Court shall be permanent and shall enjoy in the territory of each State party such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
109. Crawford, supra note 1, at 144;

BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, sUPRA

note 1, at 203, et

seq.
110.
111.
112.
113.

1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 22; Crawford, supra note 1, at 144.
See Draft Report, supra note 80.
See 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(2Xc).
Draft Report, supra note 80.
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fulfillment of its purposes." This provision raises several questions:
does the Court have authority to run an investigation in other States?
Does it have authority to subpoena witnesses or to participate in
searches and seizures pursuant to their investigation of pertinent
crimes? The phrase, "such legal capacity as may be necessary" to perform its functions is broad. Is it "necessary" that some sort of mutual
assistance treaty be established between the Court and the relevant
State-situs of such investigation? Does it have the power to secure the
person of an accused for trial in the Court? If so, how exactly will that
occur? The ICTY Statute is even broader and the above-mentioned
questions obtain even greater importance.
1.

Cooperation and Judicial Assistance

Article 29 of the ICTY Statute provides:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not
limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International
Tribunal.
The ICTY was established on the basis of a Chapter VII decision.1 4 This origin creates a binding obligation on all States-Parties to
the United Nations to take whatever steps are required to implement
the decision." 5 All States are obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal
and to assist it in all stages of the proceedings; to ensure compliance
with requests for judicial or other legal assistance in the gathering of
evidence; hearing of witnesses, suspects, or experts; identification and
location of persons; the arrest and detention of persons; the surrender
or transfer of the accused to the tribunal; and service of documents."16
States are obligated to effectuate all orders issued by the Trial Chamber [or prosecutor's office?], such as warrants of arrest, search warrants, warrants for the surrender or transfer of persons, and any other

114. See Draft Report, supra note 80, 23.
115. Draft Report, supra note 80, 125; 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art.
29.
116. Draft Report, supra note 80, 125; 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art.
29; see also Jordan J. Paust, When We Meet an Alleged War Criminal in Bosnia, ASIL
Intl Crim. Law Interest Group Newsl. no. 1, at 6 (1996); PAUST ET AL., supra note 46, at
79-80.
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orders necessary for the conduct of the trial(s).117 The order to transfer
an accused or other persons to the ad hoc Tribunal is considered to be
a Chapter VII enforcement measure."l 8 Several of these obligations
raise serious issues, including many of those noted in the first paragraph of this section. Others include whether it is appropriate or legal
under various domestic legal systems to require a state to transfer a
case to the ad hoc Tribunal, if the state is already vigorously prosecuting or planning to prosecute the defendant? Will the Tribunal be as effective as the state? What if the state prosecutors believe in good faith
that they can do a better job? Is it proper to require them to transfer
the fugitive to the Tribunal? These issues were actually pertinent to
the Tadic case currently being prosecuted before the ad hoc Tribunal
in the Hague, after transfer from Germany. Nevertheless, transfer is
clearly required by the statute. If transfer were not required, of course,
the danger of sham prosecution would arise. On the other hand, what
sanctions will the Security Council really be able to impose for disobedience, given the veto?
2.

Is Sending a Fugitive to the Court Extradition?

Another related question, not to be addressed at length herein, but
one that is significant, is whether the rendering of the fugitive is an
extradition. The issue is important, because in States like the U.S., extradition triggers certain constitutional and statutory protections,
which may not be ignored but which are ignored by both the ICTY and
the 1994 ILC Draft Statutes. 119 Failure to conform to the rules protecting accused fugitives, provided to accused fugitives in the realm of extradition, will thwart their being "rendered" to the tribunal, whatever
the statute drafters choose to call the transfer.
3.

The Importance of a Treaty or Implementing Legislation

If transfer of a defendant to an international tribunal is extradition, the question of whether the statute functions as a treaty is crucial for the United States, unless other legislation covers it. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that extradition from the United States is not
possible without an applicable extradition treaty.120 One could argue

117. Draft Report, supra note 80, $ 125.
118. Id. 9 126.
119. See, e.g., Coumou v. United States, 1995 WL 2292 (E.D.La. 1995) ("[Tlhe Court
relies on the testimony of [Professor] Christopher Blakesley, [who establishes the notion
of "de facto" or "functional" extradition.] The Court agrees with Blakesley's use of the
phrase . . . [although it] agrees with defendant's argument that these words have no
[prior] legal recognition, and so, apparently, does Blakesley (Transcript 518). They do,
however, pretty well articulate the events which occurred..
. .") 1995 WL 2292 at 11;
Coumou v. U.S., 1997 WL80441 (5th Cir. 1997) (approving the decision).
120. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US. 276, 287 (1933); Valentine v. US. ex rel. Neidecker, 199 U.S. 5, 18 (1936). See discussion in Blakesley, Extradition Between France &
the US.: An Exercise in Comparative and InternationalLaw, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L.
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that it is extradition, whatever it is called: a rose by any other name is
still a rose. If so, it is necessary that some form of an extradition type
treaty or clause be entered into and that it receive the advice and con1 21
It
sent of the Senate or that legislation be promulgated to do so.
may be necessary that the treaty or clause call for the extradition, rendition or other relevant action to deliver the fugitive to the tribunal for
trial. Is it an extradition, as called for by U.S. jurisprudence when a
fugitive is being sent to an international tribunal rather than a State?
While these are questions that will likely be answered in the affirmative, they will have to be addressed by the courts in the United States.
It could be argued that the U.N. Charter, via the above-mentioned provisions and Article 25 could function like an extradition treaty. It could
be considered, at least, as a treaty-based mechanism for the rendition
of individuals. One must ask whether this approach will be upheld
under Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a fugitive were to be requested
from the U.S. A new treaty creating a permanent court could satisfy
U.S. law with an extradition clause, such as Article 10(2) of the Hostages Convention. 22 This problem has been obviated, perhaps, by the
promulgation of a law that provides for extradition or rendition to the
tribunal.m This law authorizes the rendition of fugitives to the ad hoc
Tribunal and could apply to any Permanent Court and cover the incidents and issues relating to that rendition. Its constitutionality remains to be tested, but it is likely to prevail.
The U.S. Supreme Court insisted on a treaty for the U.S. to extradite, because the U.S. extradition statute so requires. 124 A statute,
therefore, may be sufficient, assuming that a prima facie case and all
other requirements are established for surrender. A statute is necessary because of the principle that individuals cannot be apprehended
without general legislative authorization. This point is very important!
It is certainly necessary in the U.S. that there be enabling or implementing legislation for the process to work. The Council of Europe is

653, 656-62 (1980); BLAKESLEY,

TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 185-92; O1vER ET AL, supra
note 1, at 217-24.
121. E.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, art. 10(2), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
122. Id.
123. The A.B.A. Task Force calls for this arrangement. See Report of the American
Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Task Force on War Crimes in
Former Yugoslavia, at xii (Proposed Final Draft, June 22, 1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. Task
Force Report] (and what has been done for the Ad Hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia). See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-106,
1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996); see Robert Kushen & Kenneth Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by the United States to the War Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
G.O.A.J.I.L. 510 (1996).
124. Factor v. Laubenheimer, supra note 120; Valentine v. United States, supra note
120. The Valentine Statute covers international tribunals. The U.S. has amended its extradition statute to cover international criminal tribunals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184, as
amended 1996, supra note 123.
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working on model implementing legislation. This drafting has been
done for the ICTY and Rwanda Tribunal.
E. Non-bis-in-idem the Accused

Nexus between Jurisdiction and the Rights of

Article 10 of the Yugoslav ad hoc Statute reads:
1. No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under
the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by
the International Tribunal.
2. A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law may be
subsequently tried by the International Tribunal only if:
(a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an
ordinary crime; or
(b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted.
3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted
of a crime under the present Statute, the International Tribunal
shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by
a national court on the same person for the same act has already
been served.
The principle of non bis in idem, whereby no person shall be tried
twice for the same offense, thus, is incorporated.12 5 Given the primacy
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, subsequent trial before a national court
should be forbidden, although the Secretary-General's Report notes
that subsequent trial by the International Tribunal would be appropriate when: (a) "the characterization of the act by the national court did
not correspond to its characterization under the statute, or (b) considerations of impartiality, independence or effective means of adjudication were not guaranteed in the proceedings before the national
courts."126 Should the Tribunal decide to assume jurisdiction over a
person who has already been convicted by a national court, the former
should take into consideration the extent to which any penalty imposed by the national court has already been served. 7 The use of the
phrase, "the characterization of the act by the national courts did not
correspond to its characterization under the statute" may be problematic. It might have been more appropriate to indicate that if the conduct alleged to have been committed did not constitute an offense of
the same gravity, the Tribunal will not be precluded from re-trying the
case. The characterization of the offense is not the key. Rather, the key
is the nature of the criminal conduct and its punishability under inter-

125. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 9 66.

126. Id.
127. Id.

68.
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national law and the Tribunal's statute. The language of the ICTY Ad
Hoc Statute Article 10 still poses somewhat of a problem in this regard, but it is better than the language of the Report. Article 10(2)(b)
indicates that retrial may take place if the "national court proceedings
were not impartial. .

. ."

This language probably refers to a situation

of the kind suggested by the next phrase, which speaks of the accused
being "shielded from international criminal responsibility." It may well
be important also to include, in any statute for a permanent court, situations where the International Tribunal will be more protective of the
human rights of the accused than would be a national court which
may not be "impartial" or "well-disposed."
F. Trial in Absentia
While the ad hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia rejected trial in
absentia, the ILC Draft Statute, Article 37 provides for trial in absentia under some circumstances in what appears to be a compromise:
1. As a general rule, the accused should be present during trial.
2. The Trial Chamber may order that the trial proceed in the absence of the accused if:
(a) the accused is in custody, or has been released pending trial,
and for reasons of security or the ill-health of the accused it is undesirable for the accused to be present;
(b) the accused is continuing to disrupt the trial; or
(c) the accused has escaped from lawful custody under this Statute
or has broken bail.
3. The Chamber shall, if it makes an order under paragraph 2, ensure that the rights of the accused under this Statute are
respected, and in particular:
(a) that all reasonable steps have been taken to inform the accused
of the charge; and
(b) that the accused is legally represented, if necessary by a lawyer
appointed by the Court.
4. In cases where a trial cannot be held because of the deliberate
absence of an accused, the Court may establish, in accordance with
the Rules, an Indictment Chamber for the purpose of:
(a) recording the evidence;
(b) considering whether the evidence establishes a prima facie case
of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and
(c) issuing and publishing a warrant of arrest in respect of an accused against whom a prima facie case has been established.
5. If the accused is subsequently tried under this Statute:
(a) the record of evidence before the Indictment Chamber shall be
admissible;
(b) any judge who was a member of the Indictment Chamber may
not be a member of the Trial Chamber.
The Statute for the ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal wisely did not adopt
trial in absentia. Some have argued vigorously in favor of trial in ab-
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sentia.128 Others argue less vigorously, but would allow such trials. 129
Those favoring it have succeeded in the ILC Draft Statute. Often systems which allow trials in absentia provide that the party who was
tried in absentia has a right to a trial de novo. The protections afforded the accused in a trial in absentia and its trial de novo are chimerical. Adoption of trial in absentia is dangerous and unacceptable; it
is a serious defect in the ILC Draft. Trial in absentia certainly accommodates the likely difficulty such a tribunal often will face in not being able to obtain the person of the accused. Trials in absentia, however, are anathema to the Common Law systems. Some of the
arguments against trials in absentia, presented immediately below, apply to continental criminal justice systems in general. The point is that
there may be a tendency in the world community to adopt a European
model for the war crimes tribunal. Trial in absentia, however, raises
serious problems for those from the "common law" or "adversarial"
model of criminal justice.130 Trials in absentia, moreover, necessarily
violate Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes the right of any accused "[t]o be tried
in his presence."
Continental criminal justice systems have built-in protections for
individuals accused of crime. These protections have not been incorporated into the statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunal or the ILC Draft. One
can argue that sending a person to the Tribunal after a conviction in
absentia cannot lead to a new trial that will be compatible with U.S.,
Canadian and other adversarial system constitutional standards or
even continental standards.ul3 The same is likely true of New Zealand,

128. Of the vigorously approving side, see Letter Dated 10 Feb. 1993 from the Permanent Resident of France to the U.N. addressed to the Security Council,
108,
U.N.Doc. S/25266 [hereinafter Report of the Committee of French Jurists]; see also
Schiktte, Comments at Conference on the Ad Hoc Tribunal at the Max Planck Institute,
Freiburg, Germany; Julian Schutte, Comments at the XV Congresso Internacionalde Dirito Penal, Rio De Janeiro, September 5-10, 1994; Julian Schfitte, Comments at the World
Conference on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Tribunal to Enforce International Criminal Law and Human Rights, In Cooperation with the UN. and the AIDP,
Dec. 2-5, 1992.
129. Of the less vigorous, yet still approving side, see Wedgwood, supra note 15, at
267-70 (1994).
130. For more analysis on this, see Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 1; Blakesley,
Atrocity and its Prosecution, supra note 1.
131. It seems to me that one should be hard pressed to accept trial in absentia, unless one is willing to accept it under one's own domestic law. But see Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (no habeas corpus when sending a person to an international tribunal); PAuST ET AL., supra note 46, at 275. Moreover, disruptive defendants
have been removed from the courtroom in the United States, although this may be distinguishable, if still not acceptable. It seems to me that just because a given system in
times of stress or hysteria tends to take action that is violative of fundamental fairness,
it should not be made or accepted as a rule of law. Why should it be acceptable? One can
understand by the hysteria surrounding war and atrocity and serious improper (one
might say "illegal,* in a fundamental sense) conduct by a state, which is even approved
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Australia, and now South Africa. In terms of minimum standards of
protection for an accused person in International Human Rights Law,
increasingly, U.S. requests for extradition and hand-overs under Status
of Forces agreements have been overridden by international and foreign courts that have ruled international human rights provisions take
precedence. In two of the cases, concerns over capital punishment in
the U.S. have resulted in litigation in which courts outside the U.S.
have held that turning persons over to states in the U.S. with the
death penalty would in certain circumstances violate provisions of international human rights conventions. 132 International human rights
conventions contain rights that sometimes are equivalent to protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In particular, the provisions
guaranteeing the right to fair trial, equality of arms and access to
court, 133 the presumption of innocence,

34

the right to confrontation,

35

and the right to counsel of choice.
The problem is in the scope of
these rights, which are written into human rights treaties in abstract
terms. For example, in many European systems, although one has the
right to counsel, the right does not obtain until the dossier has been finalized and handed-over to the indictment court. There is no right to
counsel even during "custodial interrogations." In most jurisdictions,
the dossier is evidence and the case against the accused is virtually
complete by that time. 3 6

by the judiciary. See, e.g., Koramatsu v. United States, 323 US. 214 (1944). This situation, however, is not acceptable unless one trusts that due process protections may properly be dismissed by authorities who, perhaps, have some sense about who is a "terrorist," a "war criminal," or other evil type. More on this tendency is discussed in John
Dugard, The Judiciary in a State of National Crisis - With Special Reference to the
South African Experience, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 477 (1987). My position is that one
should not trust one's domestic governmental officials with such power, why should one
give it to an international institution? If a trial in absentia were followed, necessarily, by
a trial de novo in which none of the prior dossier or prior evidence could be used, it
would be more acceptable. Again, however, one might be skeptical about the impact that
this evidence might have.
132. For background on the cases, see, e.g., S6ering v. United Kingdom, 11 HuM.
RTS. L J. 3-35 (1990); Steinhardt, Recent Developments in the Soering Litigation, 11
HuM. RTs. L.J. 1073 (1990).
133. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), U.N.T.S. 222.
134. Id. art. 6(2).
135. On human rights and due process, see PAUST ET AL., supra note 46, at 734-41;
BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 1, chs. 1, 2, 4 & Conclusion.

136. See, eg., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITY (Christine Van den
Wyngaeert ed.) ch. 1, Belgium; ch. 5, Germany; ch. 6, Greece; ch. 10, The Netherlands;
and most of the others (1993); HENNING FENNELL, JORG, & SwART, CRIMINAL JuS7ICE IN
EUROPE, ch. 1, the Netherlands (1995). The Italian attempt at improvement has not
fared very well in application.
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MORE ON TRIGGERING MECHANISMS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AD

Hoc

OTHER SIMILARITIES AND
TRIBUNAL AND ANY FUTURE

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

Although the Ad Hoc Tribunals are being created solely for the
purpose of prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law in
the former Yugoslavia since 1991 or in Rwanda, they will have an impact on the development of a permanent international criminal tribunal. This impact will be positive or negative, depending on whether
the ad hoc Tribunals are fashioned and proceed in a manner that
brings credit to the international legal system. The ICTY seems to be
proceeding in this way, with the assistance of excellent judges, prosecutors, and defense teams, but they must also be perceived as being effective in obtaining the person and prosecuting major perpetrators of
the indicated crimes in a manner that comports with the international
human rights protections afforded accused individuals. They must be
perceived as producing results, i.e., convicting perpetrators. Failure on
any of these fronts could damage the development or acceptance of a
permanent tribunal.
Dangers abound: difficulty in obtaining evidence in a manner that
comports with protections guaranteed accused persons; difficulty in obtaining custody of accused individuals; difficulty in protecting victims
of the atrocities while obtaining meaningful and usable evidence
against accused persons; and many, many other crucial problems face
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 137 Proper resolution of these problems is indispensable if this enterprise is not to damage the effort to establish a
permanent tribunal.
Some of the problems actually facing the Ad Hoc Tribunal, however, are different from those that would face a permanent tribunal.
Armed forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia appear not to
have kept good records; some of the alleged atrocities may have been
perpetrated by loosely controlled members of local militia type groups,
for which it may be difficult to establish a clear command responsibility leading to major order givers and other higher-ups. It appears that
the groups which are alleged to have perpetrated many of the atrocities are now in control of areas where evidence or perpetrators may
exist. This situation makes it difficult to expect and to receive their cooperation. These are some of the harsh realities of the situation currently facing the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The Rwanda Tribunal's prospects
diminish as chaos again descends on that terror-ridden land. To the
extent that these difficulties may not face a permanent tribunal the

137. For example, there is an inconsistency between the defendant's right to crossexamine witnesses pursuant to Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute and the victims' and witnesses' right to be protected from appearing before the Tribunal under Article 22. See
also ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 20(1).
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differences must be emphasized by those interested in promoting the
Tribunals.
A. The Power and Authority of the Prosecutors Office cant Dangers
1.

More Signifi-

General

The relationship of the Prosecutors Office in the ILC Tribunal and
the Ad Hoc Tribunals to the Tribunal itself is a fascinating and important one, especially given the nature of the Tribunals which straddle
the Common Law and European models. Questions were raised in the
ILC whether the permanent tribunal's prosecutor should be a collegial
body rather than an individual. The prosecutor must be independent
and must have the financial and political wherewithal to meet the
high burden of investigation and prosecution of such significant offenses. In addition, the issue of the Procuracy's role, training, and approach must be addressed more carefully than it has been up to now.
The system created for the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for example, straddles precariously between the Anglo-American
or Common Law Systems and those of the "Civil Law" world. This balance is not bad in itself; indeed, it is good. However, making systemic
decisions and providing organization, resources and training, without a
thorough study of how the system is to work, could be disastrous. The
Continental System trains its procureurs as judges, inculcating the instincts to protect civil liberty and human rights. They do not depend
on the adversarial system to counter-act the "win at any cost" mentality that can take over the common law approach. 138 During the Niirnberg Trials, aspects of the adversarial system were adopted. The
judges understood that model and stood by as umpires for the battle.
The problem was that many of the defense attorneys for the Germans
had absolutely no training in the techniques or mindset of the advocate in the adversarial world. Lack of care or attention to detail could
establish a system that incorporates the worst of each system, rather
than the best. Here follows a discussion of some of the pitfalls of which
one must be wary. While the points made below are harsh and are
generalizations, they are accurate. The protections vary from nation to
nation, but they are essentially of the same sort. They are based on a
model in which the protection of society, including the accused, is dependent on the quality and good-faith of the prosecutor and judge.
ILC Draft, Article 12, provides that the Procuracy is an "independent organ of the Court" (continental model). The essence of its nature
is the same as that indicated above and discussed below.

138. One may wonder, however, whether European prosecutors, despite a good faith
desire to be neutral, do not develop a particular theory of this case and become "adversarial" to the persons they suspect committed the crime.
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2.

The Prosecution in the ILC Approach

ILC Article 13, Composition, Functions, and Powers of the
Procuracy, states:
1. The Procuracy shall be composed of a Prosecutor, who shall be
Head of the Procuracy, a Deputy Prosecutor and such other qualified staff as may be required.
2. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor shall be of high moral
character and possess the highest level of competence and experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal
cases. They shall be elected by a majority vote of the States parties
to this Statute from among candidates nominated by the States
parties thereto for a term of five years and be eligible for reelection.
3. The States parties shall, unless otherwise decided, elect the
Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor on a standby basis.
4. The Procuracy, as a separate organ of the Tribunal, shall act independently, and shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or any source.
5. The Prosecutor shall appoint such staff as are necessary to carry
out the responsibilities of the office.
6. The Prosecutor, upon receipt of a complaint pursuant to article
28, shall be responsible for the investigation of the crime alleged to
have been committed and the prosecution of the accused for crimes
referred to in articles 22 and 26.
7. The Prosecutor shall not act in relation to a complaint involving
a person of the same nationality. In any case where the Prosecutor
is unavailable or disqualified, the Deputy Prosecutor shall act as
Prosecutor.
Prosecution may commence on the basis of a criminal complaint
brought by a State Party.139 Also, a Party that does not have prescriptive or in personam jurisdiction or that does not wish to bring a criminal complaint within its own jurisdiction, may petition the ProcuratorGeneral of the Tribunal to inquire the potential direct prosecution by
the Court. In such cases, the request by a State Party will be confidential and only after the Procurator-General of the Tribunal has deemed
the evidence sufficient will the case for prosecution be presented to the
Court in camera for the Court's action. In such a situation, the Tribunal's Procuracy acts as a Judicial Board of Inquiry.' 40 Once the
Procuracy (sitting as the Judicial Board of Inquiry) has decided

139. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 21.
140. See id. art. 12. BLAKEsLEY, DRAFT MODEL FOR PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION [OR BOARD] OF CRIMINAL INQUIRY, part of DRAFT MODEL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, adapted, with analysis from earlier DRAFT MODELS BY M.C. BAssiouNI and

that cited for the Instituto Superiore Internazionale de Scienze Criminali, Committee of
Experts on International Criminal Policy for the Prevention and Control of Transnational and International Criminality for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Siracusa, Italy, 24-28 June 1990; analysis, and alternative draft, in 1995.
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whether to prosecute, the Procurator-General will issue an indictment
and request the surrender of the accused by the State Party where the
accused may be found. The Convention includes provisions on surrendering the accused to the Tribunal and providing the Tribunal with lefor the
gal assistance (including administrative and judicial assistance)
14 1
procurement of evidence (both tangible and testimonial).
3.

The Prosecutor in the Ad Hoc Tribunals

The role, authority, and power of the prosecutor are important.
The prosecutor has significant triggering power. ICTY Article 16, The
Prosecutor, (and comparatively, Rwanda Statute Article 15) provide:
1. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.
2. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of
the International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or to receive
instructions for any Government or from any other source.
3. The Office of the Prosecutor shall be composed of a Prosecutor
and such other qualified staff as may be required.
4. The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Security Council on
nomination by the Secretary-General. He or she shall be of high
moral character and possess the highest level of competence and
experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of
criminal cases. The Prosecutor shall serve for a four-year term and
be eligible for reappointment. The terms and conditions of service
of the Prosecutor shall be those of an Under-Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
5. The staff of the Office of the Prosecutor shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Prosecutor.
The Prosecutor for the Ad Hoc Tribunals was appointed by the Security Council, upon the nomination of the Secretary-General. The obligation was to appoint someone of the highest level of competence and
experience in the conduct of criminal investigations and prosecutions
and be of high moral character. He was appointed for a four-year term
(eligible for re-appointment). His, or potentially her, terms and conditions of service shall be the same as those of an Under-SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. 142 The Prosecutor's role seems to be
based on a somewhat mixed (common law/continental) model. He or
she shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the offenses within the competence and jurisdic141. See, e.g., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, Apr. 20,
1959 (E.T.S. No. 30), and the various bilateral Conventions between various states. See,
e.g., Allan Ellis and Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, in 2 M.C. BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 151 (1986).
142. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, T 86; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.

16(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art 15(3).
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tion of the Tribunal.' The Prosecutor is to be an independent organ of
the Tribunal and is not to seek or to receive instructions from any government or other source. 144 The Prosecutor's Office will be composed of
the Prosecutor and other qualified staff, "as may be required" to per145
form the functions entrusted in an effective and efficient manner.
The staff will consist of an investigation and a prosecution unit, 146 to
be appointed by the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the
Prosecutor. 147 The staff must meet rigorous criteria of professional experience and competence; they must have relevant experience in their
own countries as investigators, prosecutors, criminal lawyers, law enforcement personnel or medical experts [and] [g]iven the nature of the
crimes committed and the sensitivities of victims of rape and sexual
assault, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff
to the employment of qualified women.4 Most of the qualification criteria for staff are spelled out only in the Report, not the Statute.

VII.

TRIGGERING INVESTIGATION & PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

1 49

ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute, Article 18 and Rwanda Article 17,
Investigation and Preparation of Indictment set out investigation and
preparation of an indictment as follows:
1. The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the
basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from
Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed.
2. The Prosecutor shall have the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. In carrying out these tasks the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned.
3. If questioned, the suspect shall be entitled to be assisted by
counsel of his own choice, including the right to have legal assistance assigned to him without payment by his in any such case if
he does not have sufficient means to pay for it, as well as to neces-

143. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7,
85; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art 15(1) (different temporal and geographic
competence).
144. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, T 85; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 15(2) (different temporal and geographic
competence).
145. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 16(3); Secretary-General'sReport, supra note
7,%87.
146. This division of labor is indicated in the Report, but not in the Statute.
147. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 9 87; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
16(5).
148. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 9 88.
149. Id. 99 98-98; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, arts. 18 & 19.
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sary translation into and from a language he speaks and
understands.
4. Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of
the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is
charged under the Status. The indictment shall be transmitted to a
judge of the Trial Chamber.
ICTY Article 19 and Rwanda Article 18, Review of the Indictment,
state:
1. The judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has
been transmitted shall review it. If satisfied that a prima facie case
has been established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the indictment. If not so satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.
2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial.
In the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the Prosecutor will initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source,
particularly from governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained and decide whether there is
sufficient basis to proceed. 50 The standard of proof to allow prosecution is that of a prima facie case.' 5 ' The Prosecutor seems to have discretion somewhat like that of a Common Law prosecutor. On the other
hand, the Prosecutor is an organ of the Tribunal, a characteristic obviously of civilian origin. The Prosecutor, in conducting investigations,
will have the authority and power to question suspects, victims and
witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. In
carrying out these tasks the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the
assistance of the State authorities concerned. 152 Once the Prosecutor
believes that a prima facie case is established, he or she will prepare
an indictment concisely stating the facts and the crimes with which
53
The indictment will
the accused is charged pursuant to the Statute.
be transmitted to the Trial Chamber for review and decision as to its
confirmation or dismissal.' 5 ' It is not clear whether the review and decision of confirmation or dismissal of the indictment is to be made by

150. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 93; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(1).
151. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 95; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(4).
152. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, %94; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(2).
153. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 95; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(4).
154. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7, 95; ICTY Statute, supra note 6,
arts. 18(4) & 19(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, arts. 17(4) & 18(1).
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the whole Trial Chamber or by a single judge. If the indictment is confirmed, the Tribunal shall issue, at the request of the Prosecutor, such
orders, and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender and transfer
of persons, or any other orders as may be necessary for the conduct of
the trial. 155
If the Prosecutor questions suspects as part of the investigation,
the suspect has the right to be assisted by counsel of his or her own
choice, including the right to have this representation without payment, if the accused cannot afford the cost. The same is true for the
cost of translation.'" One problem with this arrangement is similar to
that faced by many Continental and Common Law nations. At what
point does a person become a suspect, as opposed to a witness. Obviously, the line between witness and suspect may be blurred and since
the right to the presence of counsel obtains only for suspects, there is
room for abuse. The A.B.A. Task Force noted that the Statutes have no
provisions for pre-trial release or habeas corpus type protection for the
accused pending trial.1 57 There is danger of abuse in a Tribunal such
as this one, where there is no strict political accountability. Some sort
of pretrial protection and oversight is necessary.
VIII. TRILu

& POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Trial Fairness.ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute, Article 20. Commencement and Conduct of Trial Proceedings
ICTY Article 20 dictates:
1. The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the
rules of procedures and evidence, with full respect for the rights of
the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses.
2. A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall,
pursuant to an order or an arrest warrant of the International Tribunal, be taken into custody, immediately informed of the charges
against him and transferred to the International Tribunal.
3. The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that
the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused
understands the indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a
plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for trial.
4. The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to
close the proceedings in accordance with its rules of procedure and
evidence.

155. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 97; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
19(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 18(2).
156. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 96; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
18(3); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(3).
157. A-BA. Task Force Report, supra note 123, at x.
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The trial is to be conducted expeditiously and fairly, in accordance
with the rules of procedure and evidence, with the Trial Chamber ensuring that the rights and interests of the accused, the witnesses and
victims are given full respect and protection.15 8 A person against whom
an indictment is confirmed is to be informed of the charges against
him and shall be taken into custody and transferred to the tribunal for
prosecution; trials in absentia will not be allowed, being considered
contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 159
The trial shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to have it
closed, pursuant to its rules and procedures. 60
IX

DAMAGES IN TORT AND LA PARTIE CiMLE

It would be interesting and was suggested in the Meeting of Experts on the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and the possibilities for a Permanent Tribunals Association International de Droit Pdnal, December 4-8, 1994, Siracusa, Italy, that the
ILC Draft include language that would allow the possibility of some
sort of tort action by the victims or even for a mechanism for a victim
to be a partie civile as in France and other continental nations.' 6' The
partie civile is essentially the victim of the crime who has the right to
have his civil action associated with the criminal prosecution. In civil
law jurisdictions, this victim's right has existed for ages. He or she has
the opportunity to feel a part of the action against the defendant. It
also provides the victim with cost-free means to have his or her tort
case established. Damages are not a problem in civil law jurisdictions,
because the range is statutorily set. In addition, the burden of proof
problem is not presented, because the standard is the same in Europe
for both criminal and civil actions; the judge (or jury) must come to a
conviction intime (literally intimate conviction).
Une conviction intime is the innermost conviction of conscience
that the individual committed the crime/wrong. Commentators explain:
[I]n the system of I'intime conviction, the judge appreciates and
weighs all of the evidence presented in total liberty.162 He decides
in accordance with his conscience to convict, to mitigate or to ac-

158. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 99; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art.
20(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 19(1).
159. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7,
101-102; ICTY Statute, supra note
6, art. 19(2) (the explicit statement prohibiting trial in absentia is not in the Statute);
Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 20(2) provides similarly. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N.T.S., vol. 999, No. 14668, p. 171, and vol. 1057, p. 407.
160. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7,
103; ICTY Statute, supra note 6,
art. 20(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 19(4).
161. See, e.g., Belgian Code de Procodure Pdnale arts. 82, 63, 108; French Code de
Procedure Pgnal, arts. 85-89; Gaston Stefani, Georges Levasseur, Bernard Bouloc, PRociDURE PENALE §§ 494, et seq.; 537, et seq. (14th ed. 1990); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17, 18, 170-171 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993).
162. French Code de Procedure Pgnale, supra note 161, arts. 353, 485 & 543.
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quit, in accordance with whether he is convinced or not of the
defendant's culpability, without being obliged to give any justification whatsoever, of the probative impact or force that he attached
to any of the evidence.. . .63
This system burden of proof, of course, may not work in the "adversarial context." First, the burden of proof for a crime is beyond a reasonable doubt; too high for a civil plaintiff. Second, in an adversarial
setting, the attorney representing the partie civile would likely pit
himself against another defendant or in some other way develop friction between him and the judge. One way to ameliorate this problem is
to have the recovery of damages from defendant be totally dependant
on the conviction. This solution, however, would not resolve the problem of the difference in standard of proof. These difficulties may cause
the partie civile approach not to work well, but it is worth consideration and an attempt to resolve the difficulties.
Damages in tort ultimately may be the more efficient and fruitful
method of deterring violations of humanitarian law and promoting its
value. Justice and Professor Frank Newman noted this in a panel discussion in which I participated at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, April 1994.164 Al Rubin recommended this
Irasome time ago as an alternative to prosecution in relation to the
165
nian Air Bus and the Lockerbie incidents, among other things.
Y,

A.

TRIGGERING APPELLATE AND REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

Generally

The Secretary-General's Report and the Statute for the ICTY and
the Rwanda Ad Hoc Tribunal recognize the fundamental nature of the
right to appeal, as incorporated in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 16 The Ad Hoc Tribunal's appellate process, thus,
allows a person convicted or the prosecution to appeal errors on questions of law that would invalidate the decision and on errors of fact
which would occasion a miscarriage of justice.1 6 7 The Appellate Cham163. Id. arts. 353, 427, & 536; STEFANi, LEVASSEUR, & BouLoc, supra note 161, § 37
& 44-45.
164. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Remarks on the Ad Hoc and Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal, 88th Annual Meeting, ASIL 243, 244, 254-55, 257 (1994); Frank Newman, Comments on my presentation in same panel discussion;Id. at 253; see also Jordan
Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage Taking, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 351 (1991); Alfred P. Rubin, Remarks on the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 87 ASIL Proceedings 32-35 (1993); Alfred P. Rubin, InternationalCrime & Punishment, 33 THE NAT'L INTEREST 73 (1993).
165. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Remarks on the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 87 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 32-35 (1993); Rubin, International Crime & Punishment,
33 THE NAT'L INTEREST 73 (1993); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNrTED STATES 198-203, 212 (1996).

166. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 7, 9 116.
167. Id. 1 117; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25; Rwanda Statute, supra note 27,
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ber may reverse, affirm, or revise the decisions of the Trial ChambersM by way of decision rendered publicly and accompanied by a reasoned opinion, to which other opinions, either concurring or dissenting,
may be appended. 169 The decision of the Appellate Chamber is final. 70 The ILC Draft Statute is similar. ICTY Article 25 and Rwanda
Statute Article 24 - Appellate Proceedings
Ad Hoc Tribunal, ICTY Article 25 and Rwanda Article 24 Appellate Proceedings, provide that:
[tihe Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted
by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following
grounds: (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision;
or (b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions
taken by the Trial Chamber.

B. ILC Draft Statute Article 42
The ILC Draft Statute, Article 42, provides for the prosecution as

well as the defense to be able to appeal adverse decisions. The appeal
is a civilian-type appeal of errors of fact as well of errors of law. Article
42 provides:
[T]he Appeals Chamber, has all the powers of the Trial Chamber. If
the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed from
were unfair or that the decision is vitiated by error of fact or law, it
may: (a) if the appeal is brought by the convicted person, reverse or
amend the decision, or, if necessary, order a new trial; (b) if the appeal is brought by the Prosecutor against an acquittal, order a new
trial. If in an appeal against sentence, the Chamber finds that the
sentence is manifestly disproportionate to the crime, it may vary
the sentence in accordance with Article 47 [applicable penalties].
The decision of the Chamber shall be taken by a majority of the
judges and shall be delivered in open court. Six judges shall constitute a quorum. Subject to Article 50 [on revision, infra], the decision of the Chamber shall be final.
C.

Serious Problems Depending upon What System

Obviously, prosecutorial appeal of acquittal is problematic for
those from countries having adversarial systems. Double jeopardy,
non-bis-in-idem in civilian countries, the right to a jury trial, among
other basic constitutional protections of accused individuals, seem to

art. 24.
168. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25; Rwanda Statute, supra note 27, art. 24.
169. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25; Secretary-General's Report, supra note 7,

91118.
170. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 25.
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be put aside. Nations like the United States might be hard put to
enter into a treaty that would allow such practice.
D. The Qualifications and Election of Appellate and Trial Level
Judges
ILC Article 6, Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute Article 13 (ICTY), and
Rwanda Article 12 also pose controversial and significant issues.
Should the appellate judges have different qualifications from those of
the trial judges? Should they be elected separately? From the common
law or adversarial perspective, it is important that there be separate
elections and separate qualifications for the two types of judges because they do significantly different type of work. On the other hand,
from a civilian or continental perspective and based on the continental
nature of the tribunals under the statutes, this differentiation of expertise, talent, and election is not necessary. A related issue is that of
judicial rotation from the trial chambers to the appellate chamber in

the Ad Hoc Tribunal. This problem has proved serious for the Ad Hoc
Tribunals, but has been avoided in the ILC Draft. As the number of
cases mount in the Ad Hoc Tribunal, it will become more and more
difficult to manage. A judge cannot sit on appeal if he or she has had

any prior relationship to the case. Potentially and eventually, no
judges will be available for appellate work.
E. Review Proceedings
Article 26 of the ICTY Ad Hoc Tribunal, Article 25 (Rwanda), and
Article 50 of the ILC Draft Statute present a similar problem. Article

26 of the Ad Hoc Tribunal Statute provides that, when a new fact has
been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings
before the Trial Chambers or the Appeals Chamber and which could
have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may submit to the International Tribunal an application for review of the judgement. Article 50 of the ILC Draft Statute allows the prosecutor or the person convicted to do the same.
F. Potential US. ConstitutionalProblems
The related questions of meaningful appellate review and
prosecutorial authority to appeal or to have an acquittal revised, present potentially devastating defects from the U.S. Constitutional point
of view. Having merely one level of review is problematic. In addition,
does allowing the prosecution more than a mere interlocutory appeal
of errors of law, which would trigger a new trial for the same offense,
violate the principle against double jeopardy? To comport with the protection against being subject to jeopardy twice for the same conduct
(double jeopardy) from the perspective of United States constitutional
law, the defendant only, not the prosecution, should be allowed this
prerogative. The same is true for the notion of revision.
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CONCLUSION

The attempts to protect and enforce human rights through prosecution of those who commit serious violations of humanitarian law are
important and laudable. The success of the tribunals, indeed, the viability of both peace and justice, depends on promulgation, interpretation, supplementation, application, and enforcement. The Ad Hoc
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and the proposed
ILC Draft Statute fall short, but they are all subject to being modified
in a manner that will make them functional. This modification must
be done.

